December 24, 2015

Washington Court Rules that Light May Be Nuisance and Tree May Be Spite Structure

The Washington Court of Appeals recently ruled in a published opinion that a driveway light installed in compliance with the local code could nonetheless constitute a nuisance if certain facts are proven on remand.  The Court also ruled that a large planted tree could constitute a "spite structure" prohibited by state statute if certain facts are proven on remand.  Yes, even light and trees can be bad sometimes.      

An activity is a nuisance when it interferes unreasonably with a neighbor's use and enjoyment of his or her property.  No Washington case up to this point had decided that light can be a nuisance, but the Court ruled in this case that "a trier of fact could find that the driveway light, without the available adjustment of its shield, offends the senses so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of Haley's home."  The Court deemed it significant that no harm was identified resulting from an adjustment of the light shield at issue.  

A Washington statute provides a person with the right to obtain an injunction if a neighbor maliciously erects a structure intended to spite, injure, or annoy that person.  No Washington case up to this point had decided that one planted tree can be such a structure, but the Court ruled in this case that "a single tree artificially located and planted with spiteful intent may, depending on the circumstances, constitute a structure within the meaning of RCW 7.40.030." The Court based its ruling in part on a 1991 Washington case which held that a row of trees planted along a property line may constitute a fence prohibited by a restrictive covenant.                   

November 30, 2015

Court's Decision Compels Condominiums to Evaluate Validity of Leasing Restrictions

Condominiums created on or before July 1, 1990 are governed by the Washington Horizontal Property Regimes Act.  The Washington Condominium Act (WCA) governs condominiums created after July 1, 1990.  Under the WCA, a condominium declaration may be amended by the vote or agreement of owners to which at least 67 percent of the votes are allocated.  However, the WCA also requires the vote or agreement of a special supermajority (each unit particularly affected and the owners of units to which 90 percent of the votes are allocated) if an amendment changes "the uses to which any unit is restricted."  

The Washington Supreme Court recently decided in a unanimous published opinion that a WCA condominium's declaration amendment restricting the leasing of units was invalid because an insufficient number of owners (67 percent) approved it.  The Court first pointed out that leasing is identified as a use of a unit in the condominium's declaration.  It next noted that WCA condominiums must obtain special supermajority approval in order to amend their declarations to change the uses to which any unit is restricted. The Court concluded that this condominium's declaration required it to obtain special supermajority approval in order to amend its declaration to restrict leasing.  The amendment at issue was held to be invalid because such approval was not received. 

Many WCA condominiums' declarations identify leasing as a use of a unit.  Those condominiums' declaration amendments restricting leasing are invalid if they were not approved by a special supermajority.  Our office is here to help if your condominium association has questions about the validity of an existing declaration amendment that restricts leasing or about the necessary approval percentage for a new declaration amendment that restricts leasing.  

November 6, 2015

Washington Court of Appeals Resolves Fence Dispute, Quotes Robert Frost

The Washington Court of Appeals recently issued a published opinion that addressed a dispute between two neighbors over a fence.  The opinion begins in style by quoting Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall": "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know / What I was walling in or walling out, / And to whom I was like to give offense."  It then notes that this case illustrates the wisdom of Frost's observation in the context of an existing fence.

The trouble started when Owner A moved a fence over the objection of Owner B when a survey based on the deed description showed that the fence was located on Owner A's property.  Owner B then filed a lawsuit arguing that the fence constituted the boundary between their two properties pursuant to the legal doctrine of boundary by common grantor.  The trial and appellate courts accepted that argument.  

Application of the common grantor doctrine presents two questions: (1) was there an agreed boundary established between the common grantor and original grantee, and (2) if so, would a visual examination of the property show subsequent purchasers that the deed line no longer functioned as the true boundary?  The Court ruled that there was an agreed boundary in this situation because both owners' conduct showed an understanding that they owned adjacent parcels separated by the fence.  As the Court put it, the owners "manifested ownership of their separate properties in relation to the fence."  For example, Owner B occupied and cared for the property up to the fence line until the fence was moved by Owner A.  The Court went on to rule that a visual examination of the property gave notice that the fence was the true boundary.  It pointed out that "the record discloses no reason for the existence of the fence other than to function as a boundary between the properties."

October 21, 2015

Court Upholds Condominium Association Foreclosure that Extinguished Bank's Lien

In late 2009, a Washington condominium association foreclosed on a first position lien for delinquent assessments and purchased the unit at a trustee's sale for $8,818.17.  Deutsche Bank, which had a junior lien on the unit for $240,000 that was extinguished by that foreclosure sale, was notified of the association's foreclosure but did not respond.  Litigation later ensued concerning the validity of the association's foreclosure.  

The Washington Court of Appeals ruled in an unpublished opinion this summer that the association was entitled to foreclose on its lien (which had a limited six-month priority over the bank's lien pursuant to the Washington Condominium Act and its Declaration) regardless of whether there were any intervening liens and for any amount.  The court noted that Deutsche Bank failed to pay the association's lien, bid at the trustee's sale, or exercise its redemption rights despite being given ample notice and opportunity to do so.

Many foreclosures by condominium associations do not end well due to bank foreclosures and owner bankruptcies, so it is always good to be reminded that they can result in successful outcomes too.  The association's attorney can help it decide whether foreclosure is advisable and likely to result in payment.

October 14, 2015

Association Boards Should Get Their Legal Advice Straight from the Horse's Mouth*

The boards of some community associations that have property managers seldom or never communicate with their associations' attorneys directly.  This is hardly ideal.  The transmission of legal advice from attorney to client is performed most effectively when the client asks questions and receives the attorney's answers firsthand.  Nuance and complexity can be lost when legal advice is transmitted through agents.  Community association boards will obtain the best legal guidance if they play an active and direct role in the attorney-client relationship.

Washington appellate courts have been busily churning out opinions relevant to community associations recently, so more case law summaries are coming soon.

*Title inspired by the many good years I spent growing up in Texas.